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STORMING THE LAST BASTION:
THE PATENT REFORM ACT OF 2007 AND ITS
ASSAULT ON THE SUPERIOR
FIRST-TO-INVENT RULE
1. INTRODUCTION
The current United States patent laws were drafted in 1952, but
unlike nuclear fallout shelters, beatnik poetry, and the Ed Sullivan
show, they still hold sway over American life. Recently, Congress
took a major step toward its goal of refashioning these decades-old
laws. On September 7, 2007, the United States House of
Representatives narrowly passed a bill titled the "Patent Reform
Act of 2007,"' which proposes drastic changes to the current
United States patent system.2 The bill, currently on the Senate's
legislative calendar and likely to come up for vote soon, faces
heavy opposition from several interest groups, particularly small
inventors and the biotechnology industry.3 The bill proposes many
significant revisions of the current system, including expansion of
criteria for determining damages in infringement suits,4
elimination of the "best mode" requirement,5 and restriction of
venue in patent litigation suits.6
Perhaps the most sweeping and controversial proposed change,
however, is a series of proposed revisions amounting to a switch
from the "first-to-invent" system currently used in the United
1. Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007); see also S.
1145, 110th Cong. (2007).
2. Tom Ramstack, Firms Call Patent Reform Bill Too Weak, Say it Increases
Incentive to Steal Inventions, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2007, at C9.
3. Id.
4. See H.R. 1908 § 5 (specifying that "reasonable royalty" damages in 35
U.S.C. § 284 are to be limited by determination of their relationship to
contributions over prior art and entire market value).
5. Id. § 13 (stating that a patent is not invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 112 for
failing to set forth the best mode).
6. Id. § 11 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1400 to include that "a party shall not
manufacture venue by assignment, incorporation, joinder, or otherwise primarily
to invoke the venue of a specific district court").
1
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States to a "first-to-file" system. 7 The first-to-invent system of
priority, now used only in the United States, awards a patent to the
first person to create the invention, rather than the first to file an
application for a patent.8 In cases where the first inventor is not
always the first filer, an interference proceeding 9 is held to decide
who is entitled to the patent.'" The first-to-file system used in all
other nations, by contrast, grants priority to the first inventor to file
an application for a patent regardless of the date of invention."
Abandoning the former in favor of the latter has been proposed
several times in the last few decades, always unsuccessfully and
surrounded by a whirlwind of controversy. 2
Because it is neither new nor uncontroversial, the debate of first-
to-invent versus first-to-file is worth thorough examination before
reaching a conclusion as to which is best for the United States.
Part II of this article will begin by examining the history of the
first-to-invent rule, particularly as developed in the United States,
and comparing it to the first-to-file system. Since harmonization
of United States patent law with international norms is an
important rationale behind the proposed change, Part II will
additionally examine the history of harmonization of international
patent law and recent, unsuccessful attempts to switch the United
States to a first-to-file system. Part III will then examine and
explain the text of the current legislation's first-to-file provisions,
as well as arguments presented both for and against it in
congressional debates. Part IV will analyze arguments supporting
both the first-to-file and first-to-invent systems, weighing the
merits of each. Finally, Part V of this article will conclude that the
United States should adhere to its current first-to-invent system
7. Ramstack, supra note 2; see also H.R. 1908 § 3.
8. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 667 (8th ed. 2004).
9. An interference, also known as a priority contest, is an administrative
proceeding in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office conducted to determine
who is entitled to the patent when two or more applicants claim the same
invention, or when an application claims the same material as an issued patent.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 831-32 (8th ed. 2004). It occurs when the same
invention is claimed in two pending applications, or in one pending application
and a patent issued within a year of the pending application's filing date. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See infra Part II.C.
[Vol. XVIII:79
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because that system better fulfills the ends of both the United
States Constitution and abstract conceptions of justice, and
because the first-to-file system will provide no major improvement
over the current system.
II. BACKGROUND
Before the current Patent Reform Act's proposed change of
filing system can be analyzed fairly, it is necessary to sufficiently
lay out its background so that it can be viewed in its proper
historical and legal context. First, this section will examine the
historical development of the first-to-invent system in the United
States up to the 1952 Patent Act. The chronology will be followed
by an explanation of the first-to-file rule and a "track record" of
countries that have recently abandoned their first-to-invent systems
in favor of that rule. Finally, a record of proposed legislation
within the last fifty years will detail the most recent attempts to
change the United States' filing system, none of which has been
successful.
A. Development of the First-to-Invent System
The historical development of the United States' first-to-invent
system is possibly as distinctive as the sytem itself. Typical of
common-law jurisdictions, 3 the rule underwent several centuries
of transformation and clarification to reach its current
embodiment. An examination of that history reveals three distinct
periods: the first encompasses English and American patent law
before the Patent Act of 1836, entailing the origins and early
development of the first-to-invent system; the second, representing
the gradual solidification of the modem first-to-invent doctrine, is
conveniently delineated by the Patent Acts of 1836 and 1870; the
third and final period, lasting from 1870 to the present, represents
the final embodiment of the modem first-to-invent rule, including
13. This refers to nations whose legal systems derive from English judge-
made law as opposed to the Continental system, which relies upon codes and
constitutions for legal authority. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 293-94 (8th ed.
2004). Examples of common-law jurisdictions include the United Kingdom, the
United States, Australia, and others. Id.
2007]
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the current codification of the Patent Act in 1952.
1.1790 to 1836
One of the earliest pieces of federal legislation in the United
States was the Patent Act of 1790, which was largely based on the
English Statute of Monopolies of 1623.14 The English statute
granted a "privilege" of monopoly lasting fourteen years or less to
"the first and true inventor" of "any manner of new manufactures
within this realm." 15 Similarly, the American act provided that "if
it shall appear that the patentee was not the first and true inventor
or discoverer, judgment shall be rendered by [a] court for the
repeal of such patent."16
Despite the "first and true inventor" language of the 1790 Act,
statutory guidance for resolving patent priority disputes was
virtually non-existent until the 1836 Patent Act was passed.1
7
When Congress enacted the 1790 Act, among the issues it debated
was whether or not to install a special mechanism for the
resolution of priority disputes, but it ultimately left the question up
to the federal courts. 8 A second Patent Act followed in 1793, but
also failed to offer any guidance as to the meaning of "first and
true inventor."' 9  The 1793 Act merely allowed defendants in
patent infringement actions the opportunity to introduce
invalidating evidence at trial, including evidence that the subject of
the patent "was not originally discovered by the patentee."2
The federal courts, taking up their Congressionally-delegated
duties, developed an interpretation of the first-to-invent rule as
first to reduce to practice.2' In Woodcock v. Parker, Justice
Joseph Story2 articulated that interpretation as follows:
14. Sean T. Camathan, Patent Priority Disputes - A Proposed Re-Definition
of "First to Invent, "49 ALA. L. REv. 755, 755 (1998).
15. Id. (citing Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c.3, § 6 (Eng.)).
16. Id. (quoting Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 5, 1 Stat. 109, 111 (1790)).
17. Id. at 771.
18. Id. at 772.
19. Id.
20. Camathan, supra note 14, at 780 (quoting Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, §
6, 1 Stat. 318, 322 (1793)).
21. Id. at 775.
22. Joseph Story (1779-1845), served as an Associate Justice of the Supreme
[Vol. XVIII:79
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The first inventor is entitled to the benefit of his
invention, if he reduce it to practice and obtain a
patent therefor, and a subsequent inventor cannot,
by obtaining a patent therefor, oust the first inventor
of his right, or maintain an action against him for
the use of his own invention.23
2. 1836 to 1870
The 1836 Patent Act swept aside this early construction of the
meaning of "first to invent," and Justice Story's interpretation of
the new act led to the modem understanding of invention as
conception rather than reduction to practice. 4 The 1836 Act still
maintained "priority of right or invention" as the focus of
interference proceedings.25  However, the Act added an
infringement defense whereby the defendant could show that the
plaintiff "had surreptitiously or unjustly obtained the patent for
that which was in fact invented or discovered by another, who was
using reasonable diligence in adapting or perfecting the same. 26
Philadelphia & Trenton Railroad Co. v. Stimpson,27 is cited as
the origin of the Supreme Court's construction of conception as
first invention under the 1836 Act's affirmative defense.28 That
case involved a defendant's exceptions to the introduction of
certain evidence, including conversations indicating the plaintiffs
conception of the invention prior to the defendant's reduction to
Court of the United States from 1811 until his death. He wrote 269 opinions of
the Court and was instrumental in the development of American patent law,
largely because he served as Circuit Justice for New England, which was at the
time the most rapidly industrializing part of the country. See MacCormac
Snow, Joseph Story, 5 OR. L. REv. 169 (1926).
23. Woodcock v. Parker, 30 F. Cas. 491, 492 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No.
17971).
24. Carnathan, supra note 14, at 758.
25. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 8, 5 Stat. 117, 120-21 (1836) (emphasis
added).
26. Id. § 15, 5 Stat. at 123.
27. Phila. & Trenton R.R. v. Stimpson, 39 U.S. (1 Pet.) 448 (1840).
28. Carnathan, supra note 14, at 776.
2007]
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practice of the same invention.29 Writing for the Court, Justice
Story stated the following:
The invention itself is an intellectual process or
operation; and, like all other expressions of thought,
can in many cases scarcely be made known, except
by speech. The invention may be consummated and
perfect, and may be susceptible of complete
description in words, a month, or even a year before
it can be embodied in any visible form, machine, or
composition of matter."
Thus, according to the Court, the plaintiff's explanation of the
concept of his invention amounted to an assertion of his right to it,
and the judgment was affirmed.3
In Reed v. Cutter,32 decided the following year (1841), Justice
Story qualified his holding in Philadelphia & Trenton Railroad
Co. by introducing the concept of "reasonable diligence,"33 later
to become known as the "Reed doctrine":
[Reasonable diligence] seems to qualify [the] right
[of prior invention], by providing that, in such
cases, he who invents first shall have the prior right,
if he is using reasonable diligence in adapting and
perfecting the same, although the second inventor
has, in fact, first perfected the same, and reduced
the same to practice in a positive form."
Between 1853 and 1893, several cases 35 solidified the Reed
29. Phila. & Trenton R.R., 39 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 457-58, 461.
30. Id. at 462.
31. Id. at 462-63.
32. Reed v. Cutter, 20 F. Cas. 435 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 11645).
33. See DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 10.02[2][b][ii] (2007)
[hereinafter CHISUM].
34. Reed, 20 F. Cas. at 438.
35. See, e.g., Dietz v. Wade, 7 F. Cas. 684 (C.C.D.C. 1859) (holding that the
first-to-invent rule applies even where both inventors were "independent and
honest"); White v. Allen, 29 F. Cas. 969 (C.C.D. Mass. 1863) (holding that the
second inventor is entitled to a patent when the first inventor abandons his
[Vol. XVIII:79
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doctrine into the accepted rule for priority of invention.36
3. 1870 to Present
Section 42 of the Patent Act of 1870 retained and clarified the
first-to-invent rule:
Whenever an application . . . would interfere with
any pending application, or with any unexpired
patent, [the commissioner] shall give notice thereof
to the applicants, or applicant and patentee, as the
case may be, and shall direct the primary examiner
to determine the question of priority of invention.
And the commissioner may issue a patent to the
party who shall be adjudged the prior inventor...
37
Similarly, in the case law immediately following the 1870 Act,
the priority rules, as well as the meanings of conception, diligence,
and reduction to practice, came to be well-established.38
The Sixth Circuit's decision in Christie v. Seybold39 is seen as
the culmination of the courts' process of adopting and defining
Justice Story's conception and diligence doctrines.40 That case
concerned an inventor who conceived of the invention in 1885, but
due to lack of funds and requisite tools, did not reduce it to
practice until 1889, during which period the defendant conceived,
reduced to practice, and obtained a patent for the same invention.4
The court reversed the district court's ruling for the defendant and
reasoned as follows:
It is obvious.., that the man who first reduces an
invention).
36. Carnathan, supra note 14, at 785.
37. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 42, 16 Stat. 198, 204 (1870).
38. CHISUM, supra note 33, at § 10.02[3][b] (citing Marconi Wireless Tel.
Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 34-35, (1943), reh'g denied, 320 U.S. 809
(1943)).
39. Christie v. Seybold, 55 F. 69 (6th Cir. 1893).
40. CHISUM, supra note 33, at § 10.02[3][b].
41. Christie, 55 F. at 71.
2007]
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invention to practice is prima facie the first and true
inventor, but that the man who first conceives, and,
in a mental sense, first invents, a machine, art, or
composition of matter, may date his patentable
invention back to the time of its conception, if he
connects the conception with its reduction to
practice by reasonable diligence on his part, so that
they are substantially one continuous act.42
Thus, the court articulated the modern rule, with one exception,
which was resolved in 1896 when the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia held that "reasonable diligence" referred to
the time of the inventor's most recent, not original, conception,
and that it saw "no good reason why [the first conceiver] should be
compelled to extend [his diligence] back to the date of his original
conception."43 By 1936, the modem view was so firmly settled
that the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals" could state that it
"is so well settled as to require no citation of authority."45
The current codification of the first-to-invent rule4 6 was adopted
in 1952. 4" The Senate Report on the bill's drafting states only that
Section 102(g) "retains the present rules of law governing the
determination of priority of invention."48 The current Act bars a
person from receiving a patent in the following instances:
(1) [D]uring the course of an interference . . .
another inventor involved therein establishes ...
that before such person's invention thereof the
42. Id. at 76.
43. Carnathan, supra note 14, at 788 (quoting Yates v. Hudson, 8 App. D.C.
93, 99 (App. D.C. 1896)).
44. This federal court was created in 1929 to hear all appeals in customs and
patent cases. It was abolished in 1982, when its jurisdiction was superseded by
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 387
(8th ed. 2004).
45. Carnathan, supra note 14, at 788 (quoting Wilson v. Sherts, 81 F.2d 755,
762 (C.C.P.A. 1936)).
46. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2006).
47. Carnathan, supra note 14, at 790.
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invention was made by such other inventor and not
abandoned, suppressed, or concealed, or (2) before
such person's invention thereof, the invention was
made in this country by another inventor who had
not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it.49
The Act also provides a further requirement of diligence in
addition to mere priority:
In determining priority of invention under this
subsection, there shall be considered not only the
respective dates of conception and reduction to
practice of the invention, but also the reasonable
diligence of one who was first to conceive and last
to reduce to practice, from a time prior to
conception by the other."
In their construction of the current 1952 Act, the courts have not
added anything significant; their interpretation has been limited to
ironing out definitions of "conception,"'" "diligence, '"52 or
"invention."53
B. The First-to-File System
Because the first-to-file system was developed outside of
English common law, it lacks the first-to-invent system's
Anglocentric, judicially-evolved history outlined above. This
subsection will briefly explain how the first-to-file system operates
49. § 102(g).
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Oka v. Youssefyeh, 849 F.2d 581 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that
"conception" means having both an idea of the invention and an operative
method of making it); Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 359 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(holding a "conception" to be "a definite and permanent idea of the complete
and operative invention, as it is thereafter to be applied in practice").
52. See, e.g., Scott v. Koyama, 281 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(holding that diligence may take a variety of forms, including preparations for
commercial sale).
53. See, e.g., Pfaffv. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 66 (1998) (stating that
"invention" refers to a concept that is complete, not substantially complete).
2007]
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as well as chronicle its recent adoption by various foreign nations.
Furthermore, since harmonization is frequently cited as a reason
for the United States to become a first-to-file nation,54 efforts to
harmonize international patent law within the last century and a
half will also be examined.
1. Explanation and Recent Adoption
The world's first patent systems followed neither the first-to-
invent nor the first-to-file rule, but rather used a "first-to-import"
system, in which the first person to bring new technology into a
nation had prior rights to it. 55 An example of this system is the
first modern patent act, passed by the Venetian Senate on March
19, 1474, which granted rights to anyone "who shall build any new
and ingenious device in this City, not previously made in our
Commonwealth."56
Over the course of time, every nation except the United States
has adopted the "first-to-file" system, where priority of invention
is given to applicants who have submitted their patent application
first. 7 Model representations of codifications of the first-to-file
rule can be seen in patent laws of Japan and the European Patent
Office. Japan's statute provides that "[w]here two or more patent
applications relating to the same invention are filed on different
dates, only the first applicant may obtain a patent for the
invention. ' 59 Likewise, the European Patent Office's rule is that
"if two or more persons have made an invention independently of
each other, the right to the European patent shall belong to the
54. See, e.g., 153 CONG. REC. E774 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 2007) (statement of
Rep. Berman).
55. Max Stul Oppenheimer, Harmonization through Condemnation: Is New
London the Key to World Patent Harmony?, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 445,
460 (2007).
56. Giulio Mandich, Venetian Patents (1450-1550), 30 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y
166, 176-77 (1948).
57. Ryan K. Dickey, The First-to-Invent Patent Priority System: an
Embarrassment to the International Community, 24 B.U. INT'L L.J. 283, 285
(2006).
58. See Oppenheimer, supra note 55, at 461.
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person whose European patent application has the earliest date of
filing.. ."60
Even nations that have historically followed the first-to-invent
system have now switched to first-to-file. Though the origin of the
first-to-invent rule lies in an English statute, Britain effectively
became a first-to-file country with its Patent Act of 1949.6" The
provisions of that Act read that the first to apply for patent
protection is, at law, the "true and first inventor."62 Historically,
other important first-to-invent nations were Japan and Canada,
which switched to first-to-file systems in 1919 and 1989
respectively.63 The Philippines was the most recent nation to
switch from a first-to-invent to a first-to-file system, which went
into effect January 1, 1998. 6  Rumors abound that Jordan also
remains a first-to-invent nation, but strong assertions have been
made to the contrary, so its exact classification is still a matter of
debate.65
The reasons for the steady flow of nations adopting the first-to-
file system focus mainly on harmonization goals. Japan's switch
followed its accession to provisions of the Paris Convention,
60. European Patent Convention, Oct. 5, 1973 art. 60, § 2, 1065 U.N.T.S.
1999, available at http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/e/ar60.html.
61. Richard C. Wilder, Playing Cards in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,
2 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 237, 237-38 (1994) (citing T.R. Nicolai, FIRST-
To-FILE vs. FIRST-TO-INVENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY BASED ON GERMAN AND
UNITED STATES PATENT LAW, IIC, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1972)).
62. Id. (quoting Patent Act, 1949, 14 Geo. 6, § l(1)(a) (Eng.)).
63. Oppenheimer, supra note 55, at 459. Canada traced its first-to-invent
rule to the United States' 1836 Patent Act. MARTIN J. ADELMAN, RANDALL R.
RADER, JOHN R. THOMAS & HAROLD C. WEGNER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
PATENT LAW 254 (2d ed. 2003). In Christiana v. Rice,[1931] A.C. 770, the
Privy Council held that a second inventor may not obtain a patent regardless of
the circumstances of the first invention (in that case, the first inventor kept his
invention secret in a foreign country is entitled). Id. Thus, the Canadian first-
to-invent rule was stricter than its American antecedent. Id.
64. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, The U.S. First-to-Invent System Has Provided No
Advantage to Small Entities, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 425, 425 n.
1 (2002) (citing Intellectual Property Code of the Phillipines, Rep. Act No.
8293, (Jan. 1, 1998) (Phil.)).
65. Wilder, supra note 61, at 238-39 (arguing that the Jordanian patent law is
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which were modeled on the German patent system.66 In Canada's
case, the switch to a first-to-file system was explicitly the result of
a 1989 effort to harmonize international patent law.17 Thus, in at
least one recent case, harmonization of international patent law is
largely the force behind the drive to replace the first-to-invent
system with the first-to-file system.
2. The First-to-File Rule and Harmonization
Though the general trend among the world's nations appears to
be moving away from first-to-invent systems and toward first-to-
file ones, the actual history of international patent harmonization
agreements, spanning well over a century, reveals a general shying
away from any attempt at a uniform international rule of priority.
One of the first attempts at international harmonization of patent
law was the 1883 International Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property (known as the Paris Convention).68 The Paris
Convention established an international right of priority in all
member countries69 for six months7" following the filing of a
patent application in one member country. 7' Though one of the
Paris Convention's main ends was to ease the harshness of the
first-to-file rule by creating the grace period,72 it did not address
any discrepancies between the first-to-invent and the first-to-file
66. Masaaki Kotabe, A Comparative Study of U.S. and Japanese Patent
Systems, 23 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 147, 149 (1992).
67. Evan I. Schwartz, Patents Go Global, TECH. REV., May 2003,
http://www.technologyreview.com/Biztech/13177/page2/.
68. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1147-48 (8th ed. 2004); see also Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, March 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T.
1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocswo020.html [hereinafter Paris
Convention].
69. The original eleven signatories were France, Belgium, Brazil, Guatemala,
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, El Salvador, Serbia, Spain, and Switzerland.
CHISUM, supra note 33, at § 14.02[1][a]. The United States adhered to the
convention in 1887, but did not fully implement its terms for some years. Id.
70. This was later extended to twelve months in the 1900 Brussels revision.
Id. § 14.02[l][b].
71. Id. § 14.02[l][a].
72. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1147 (8th ed. 2004).
[Vol. XVIII:79
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systems.73 In fact, the 1934 London Revision of the Convention,
which denied rights to third parties active during the grace period,
expressly included an exception for first-to-invent nations:
"[r]ights acquired by third parties before the date of the first
application which serves as the basis for the right of priority are
reserved under the domestic legislation of each country of the
Union. 74
In 1970, the Patent Cooperation Treaty ("PCT") emerged from a
conference among members of the Paris Convention.75  The
purpose of the PCT was to reduce "the duplication of effort
involved, both for applicants and national Patent Offices, in the
filing and processing of patent applications for the same invention
in different countries. 76  Furthermore, the PCT was explicitly
non-binding with respect to systems of priority: the procedures it
prescribed were "optional, . . . not intended to replace present
domestic filing procedures, and in no way diminish the rights of
priority and national treatment .... .,, Thus, the PCT had no real
effect on establishing an international norm for priority rules.
The next important step toward international harmonization of
patent law came in 1994 with the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS"), a byproduct of
the lengthy "Uruguay Round" 78 trade negotiations that resulted in
the General Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade ("GATT") and
established the World Trade Organization ("WTO"). 79  Though
TRIPS established minimum standards of protection for 150
countries, it did not attempt to create a uniform global patent
73. Akim F. Czmus, Biotechnology Protection in Japan, the European
Community, and the United States, 8 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 435, 454
(1994).
74. CHISUM, supra note 32, § 14.02[1][e] (quoting Paris Convention, supra
note 67, art. 4).
75. Id. § 14.02[4].
76. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-592 (1975)).
77. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-592).
78. By the end of the Uruguay Round, 125 countries, including the United
States, were participating, and most were signatories to the resulting treaties.
World Trade Organization, History,
http://www.wto.org/trade-resources/history/wto/urug-round.htm (last visited
Feb. 25, 2008).
79. CHISUM, supra note 32, § 14.02[5].
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regime."0 Rather, it left broad latitude for national variations,
collectively termed the "TRIPS flexibilities."' Establishment of
priority date falls within the TRIPS flexibilities; an international
first-to-file standard, on the other hand, would constitute "deep
harmonization," which TRIPS avoids.8" Thus, even TRIPS, the
most recent international intellectual property law harmonization
agreement, remained silent about any preference for the first-to-
file system over the first-to-invent system, even though most
nations subscribed to first-to-file systems by the time of its
signing.
C. Recent, Aborted Attempts at Changes
Movement toward the United States adopting a first-to-file
system began in 1966 when President Lyndon B. Johnson
appointed a President's Commission on the Patent System, which
published thirty-five recommended changes, including a switch to
a first-to-file system.83 Widespread opposition, mostly from
industrial interests and small-scale inventors led to the proposal's
defeat. 84
Beginning in 1984, the World Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO") convened meetings with American government and
business leaders to discuss harmonization.85 These discussions
resulted in the Patent System Harmonization Act of 1992, whose
first-to-file provisions include, inter alia, that an applicant is
barred from receiving a patent if "the subject matter is described in
an application for patent of another applicant that has been
previously filed in the United States and has been opened to public
inspection."86  This legislation, however, lost steam when the
80. Jerome H. Reichman & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization
without Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent Law
Treaty, 57 DUKE L.J. 85, 89 (2007).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 90.
83. Christian J. Garascia, Evidence of Conception in U.S. Interference
Practice: Proving Who is the First and True Inventor, 73 U. DET. MERCY L.
REv. 717, 727 (1996).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 728.
86. Patent System Harmonization Act of 1992, H.R. 4978, 102d Cong. §
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Secretary of Commerce announced that the United States would
maintain the first-to-invent system.87
President Bill Clinton's signature on the North American Free
Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") in December 1993 amended the
Section 104 interference rules of the 1952 Act,88 allowing
inventors in the first-to-file countries of Canada and Mexico to
fully participate in interference contests with domestic inventors.89
Clinton's signature of GATT the following year extended the
Section 104 privileges held by NAFTA countries to all countries in
the WTO, which meant that most foreign applicants were no
longer held to the U.S. standard of proving they were the first to
invent. 90 Critics of the United States' adherence to the first-to-
invent system argue that the NAFTA and GATT revisions to
American patent law are steps taken toward becoming a first-to-
file system. 91
In 1997, two patent reform bills, one originating in the House
and the other in the Senate, again attempted to harmonize the
United States' patent system with those of the rest of the world,
including by switching to a first-to-file system. 92 The House's bill,
the 21 st Century Patent System Improvement Act,93 proposed what
would effectively be a first-to-file system by requiring
3(a)(3) (1992).
87. Garascia, supra note 83, at 729.
88. The Act now reads as follows:
If an invention was made by a person.., while domiciled in
the United States, . . . a NAFTA country ... or ... a WTO
member country .... that person shall be entitled to the same
rights of priority in the United States with respect to such
invention as if such invention had been made in the United
States, that NAFTA country, or that WTO member country, as
the case may be.
35 U.S.C. § 104 (2006).
89. Garascia, supra note 83, at 729-30.
90. Id. at 730-31.
91. Id.
92. Jeffery E. Robertson, If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It: The Unnecessary
Scope of Patent Reform as Embodied in the "21st Century Patent Reform Act of
1997" and the "Omnibus Patent Act of 1997," 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 573, 584
(1998).
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publication9 4 within eighteen months of the earliest filing date.95
The Senate's bill, the Omnibus Patent Act of 1997,96 also included
the eighteen-month publication provision.97 The House passed its
bill, but in the Senate, it languished along with the Omnibus Patent
Act - Republican opposition prevented both bills from ever
reaching the floor.98
Harmonization - both as an end in itself and as a means to
theorized greater convenience of a uniform international patent
system - appears to be the main reason for the continued push in
the United States for abandonment of the first-to-invent rule. In
Congressional debates over the proposed 1992 Act, a change to the
first-to-file system was viewed as a necessary, but not the only,
step to the greater goal of harmonization: "if we do not want to
change from the first-to-invent system we must be willing to
forego the benefits of harmonization."99 Such wider benefits were
stated to be reduction in time for foreign patent offices to review
applications and decreased filing costs through a uniform filing
system.' 0 In fact, the abandonment of the first-to-invent system
was referred to as a "give and take" with respect to the proposed
benefits of harmonization. 0'
III. THE CURRENT PROPOSED LEGISLATION
Congress is currently considering legislation proposing a change
in the United States' system of determining priority of patent
94. The Patent Act requires, with some exceptions, publication of patent
applications after eighteen months from filing. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2006).
Section 122(b) publication bars an applicant from receiving a patent if it
occurred before the applicant's date of invention. See id. § 102(e). House Bill
400 moved the exception for first-to-file countries of GATT from applying only
to issued patent to published applications. H.R. 400 § 374.
95. Robertson, supra note 92, at 579-80.
96. Omnibus Patent Act of 1997, S. 507, 105th Cong. (1997).
97. Id. § 122(b)(1).
98. See 144 CONG. REC. S12733 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Leahy).
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rights. This section will examine that legislation in light of current
patent law and explain the effects of its changes. After this, it will
present an account of Congressional debates both for and against
the bill as both a background to the legislation's provisions and a
prelude to a more general analysis of the desirability of the
proposed change in priority system.
A. The Bill's Provisions
The proposed Patent Reform Act of 2007 (introduced in the
House as House Bill 1908) as passed by the House contains twenty
sections of proposed amendments to the current Title 35 of the
United States Code. 12 The summary of changes amounting to a
change to the first-to-file system is embodied in the bill's Section
3, titled "Right of the First Inventor to File." 1 3
1. Proposed Changes to 35 U.S.C. § 100
The first part of Section 3 summarizes proposed additions to 35
U.S.C. § 100, which currently contains five definitions:
When used in this title unless the context otherwise
indicates-
(a) The term "invention" means invention or
discovery.
(b) The term "process" means process, art or
method, and includes a new use of a known
process, machine, manufacture, composition of
matter, or material.
(c) The terms "United States" and "this country"
mean the United States of America, its territories
and possessions.
(d) The word "patentee" includes not only the
patentee to whom the patent was issued but also the
successors in title to the patentee.
(e) The term "third-party requester" means a person
requesting ex parte reexamination... or inter partes
102. Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007).
103. Id. § 3.
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reexamination.., who is not the patent owner."
House Bill 1908 leaves these five definitions intact, but adds the
following:
(f) The term 'inventor' means the individual or, if a
joint invention, the individuals collectively who
invented or discovered the subject matter of an
invention.
(g) The terms 'joint inventor' and 'coinventor'
mean any one of the individuals who invented or
discovered the subject matter of a joint invention.
(h) The 'effective filing date of a claimed
invention' is-
(1) the filing date of the patent or the
application for patent containing the claim
to the invention; or
(2) if the patent or application for patent is
entitled to a right of priority of any other
application under section 119, 365(a), or
365(b) or to the benefit of an earlier filing
date in the United States under section 120,
121, or 365(c), the filing date of the earliest
such application in which the claimed
invention is disclosed in the manner
provided by section 112(a).
(i) The term 'claimed invention' means the subject
matter defined by a claim in a patent or an
application for a patent.'05
These definitions may not appear to add much, but defining
"inventor" and "effective filing date" are crucial to any legislation
that wishes to change a patent system from first-to-invent to first-
to-file. Establishing the meaning of "effective filing date" in
particular is necessary because so much of the ensuing first-to-file
rules depend on that date.
104. 35 U.S.C. § 100 (2006).
105. H.R. 1908 § 3(a).
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2. Proposed Changes to 35 U.S.C. § 102
Section 3 next proposes drastic changes to Section 102 of the
current Patent Act. Since Section 102 deals with novelty as a
prerequisite to patentability, the proposed changes to this section
constitute the core of the material proposing a switch to a first-to-
file system. Section 102 of the current Patent Act begins simply,
"A person shall be entitled to a patent unless -" and subsections
(a) to (g) list the exceptions. 6 The seven exceptions include the
following:
(a) the invention was known or used by others in
this country, or patented or described in a printed
publication in this or a foreign country, before the
invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a
printed publication in this or a foreign country or in
public use or on sale in this country, more than one
year prior to the date of the application for patent in
the United States, or
(c) he has abandoned the invention, or
(d) the invention was first patented or caused to be
patented, or was the subject of an inventor's
certificate, by the applicant or his legal
representatives or assigns in a foreign country prior
to the date of the application for patent in this
country on an application for patent or inventor's
certificate filed more than twelve months before the
filing of the application in the United States, or
(e) the invention was described in (1) an application
for patent, published . . . by another filed in the
United States before the invention by the applicant
for patent or (2) a patent granted on an application
for patent by another filed in the United States
before the invention by the applicant for patent,
except that an international application filed under
the treaty ... shall have the effects for the purposes
106. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
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of this subsection of an application filed in the
United States only if [it] designated the United
States and was published in the English
language, or
(f) he did not himself invent the subject matter
sought to be patented, or
(g)(1) during the course of an interference
conducted under section 135 or section 291, another
inventor involved therein establishes, to the extent
permitted in section 104, that before such person's
invention thereof the invention was made by such
other inventor and not abandoned, suppressed, or
concealed, or (2) before such person's invention
thereof, the invention was made in this country by
another inventor who had not abandoned,
suppressed, or concealed it. In determining priority
of invention under this subsection, there shall be
considered not only the respective dates of
conception and reduction to practice of the
invention, but also the reasonable diligence of one
who was first to conceive and last to reduce to
practice, from a time prior to conception by the
other. 07
House Bill 1908, first of all, restructures Section 102 into two
subsections, (a) and (b). Section (a) eliminates the current Act's
simple preamble and instead states when a patent may not be
granted:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be
obtained if-
(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in
a printed publication, in public use, or on sale-
(A) more than one year before the effective
filing date of the claimed invention; or
(B) one year or less before the effective
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than through disclosures made by the
inventor or a joint inventor or by others who
obtained the subject matter disclosed
directly or indirectly from the inventor or a
joint inventor; or
(2) the claimed invention was described in a patent
issued under section 151, or in an application for
patent published or deemed published under section
122(b), in which the patent or application, as the
case may be, names another inventor and was
effectively filed before the effective filing date of
the claimed invention.'08
This piece of proposed legislation changes the requirements for a
Section 102(a) bar from a printed publication existing "before the
invention thereof by the applicant for patent"' 9 to one existing
"more than one year before the effective filing date of the claimed
invention,"11' thus shifting the critical date for a publication bar
from dependence on date of invention to date of filing. Subsection
(a)(1)(B) of the proposed changes creates an exception to the one-
year-before-filing-date rule, allowing for collaboration between
joint inventors. 1 ' Subsection (a)(2) states that another patent or
published application bars granting a patent if that other patent
"was effectively filed before the effectivefiling date of the claimed
invention.""' 2 The subsection retains the current Section 102(e)
published application bar, but effectively nullifies the current
102(g) provisions by establishing another application's prior filing,
not prior invention, as the critical date barring issuance of a
patent. 3
Subsection (b) of the proposed legislation provides a list of
exceptions to Subsection (a) - that is, it lists circumstances when a
patent may be granted. The first exception, called the "prior
inventor disclosure exception," states as follows:
108. H.R. 1908 § 3(b)(1).
109. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).
110. H.R. 1908 § 3(b)(1).
Ill. Id.
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Subject matter that would otherwise qualify as prior
art based upon a disclosure under subparagraph (B)
of subsection (a)(1) shall not be prior art to a
claimed invention under that subparagraph if the
subject matter had, before such disclosure, been
publicly disclosed by the inventor or a joint
inventor or others who obtained the subject matter
disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or
a joint inventor."4
In other words, if parties who receive information' from an
inventor publicly divulge it, that divulgence does not qualify as
prior art.
The second exception is actually a series of three exceptions
called the "derivation, prior disclosure, and common assignment
exceptions." It reads:
Subject matter that would otherwise qualify as prior
art only under subsection (a)(2) shall not be prior
art to a claimed invention if-
(A) the subject matter was obtained directly or
indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor;
(B) the subject matter had been publicly disclosed
by the inventor or a joint inventor or others who
obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or
indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor
before the date on which the application or patent
referred to in subsection (a)(2) was effectively filed;
or
(C) the subject matter and the claimed invention,
not later than the effective filing date of the claimed
invention, were owned by the same person or
subject to an obligation of assignment to the same
person. "5
Thus, patents or published patent applications filed before the
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subject matter is directly obtained from the inventor of the former,
disclosed before the filing date of the former, or owned or assigned
to the same party as the former. These exceptions effectively
soften the burdens of the first-to-file rule articulated in Subsection
(a)(2) by still allowing patent issuance to prior inventors who
disclose their invention before a subsequent inventor files a patent
application, as well as to prior inventors who are themselves also
subsequent inventors who filed first.
The third exception, called the "joint research agreement
exception," states as follows:
(A) In general. Subject matter and a claimed
invention shall be deemed to have been owned by
the same person or subject to an obligation of
assignment to the same person in applying the
provisions of paragraph (2) if-
(i) the claimed invention was made by or on
behalf of parties to a joint research
agreement that was in effect on or before the
effective filing date of the claimed
invention;
(ii) the claimed invention was made as a
result of activities undertaken within the
scope of the joint research agreement; and
(iii) the application for patent for the
claimed invention discloses or is amended
to disclose the names of the parties to the
joint research agreement.
(B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term
'joint research agreement' means a written contract,
grant, or cooperative agreement entered into by two
or more persons or entities for the performance of
experimental, developmental, or research work in
the field of the claimed invention."6
This exception merely clarifies the phrase "owned by the same
person" stated in the previous "common assignment exception,"
116. H.R. 1908 § 3(b)(1).
20071
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defining what in fact constitutes such ownership.
The final Subsection (b) exception is for "patents and published
applications effectively filed," and it reads as follows:
A patent or application for patent is effectively filed
under subsection (a)(2) with respect to any subject
matter described in the patent or application-
(A) as of the filing date of the patent or the
application for patent; or
(B) if the patent or application for patent is entitled
to claim a right of priority under section 119,
365(a), or 365(b) or to claim the benefit of an
earlier filing date under section 120, 121, or 365(c),
based upon one or more prior filed applications for
patent, as of the filing date of the earliest such
application that describes the subject matter. 117
This exception essentially restates the meaning of "effectively
filed," but this time references statutory exceptions allowing
earlier right of priority or filing date.
3. Proposed Changes to 35 U.S.C. § 103
Section 103 of the current Patent Act relates to the
nonobviousness requirement for patentability." 8 The proposed
change completely eliminates the current lengthy exceptions in
103(b) and (c), largely retaining the language of the current 103(a).
There are some modifications, however-Section 103(a) currently
reads as follows:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention
is not identically disclosed or described as set forth
in section 102 of this title, if the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented
and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary
117. Id.
118. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
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skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner
in which the invention was made. 9
The proposed change would have the entirety of Section 103
read as follows:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be
obtained though the claimed invention is not
identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if
the differences between the claimed invention and
the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a
whole would have been obvious before the effective
filing date of the claimed invention to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed
invention pertains. Patentability shall not be
negated by the manner in which the invention was
made. 120
The only major difference between the current statute and the
proposed change is that the date for determination of obviousness
changes from the invention's date of manufacture to its effective
filing date. This change would be consistent with the overarching
change of the patent system from first-to-invent to first-to-file.
4. Proposed Changes to 35 U.S.C. § 135
Section 135 of the current Patent Act outlines the scope and
procedure of interferences.' 2' That section defines an interference
as occurring "[w]henever an application is made for a patent which
• ..would interfere with any pending application, or with any
unexpired patent" and provides that in an interference "[t]he Board
of Patent Appeals and Interferences shall determine questions of
priority of the inventions and may determine questions of
patentability." 12 2 Since the entire purpose of an interference is to
119. Id. § 103(a) (emphasis added).
120. H.R. 1908 § 3(c) (emphasis added).
121. See 35 U.S.C. § 135.
122. Id. § 135(a). The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences is a quasi-
2007]
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determine priority of invention, the necessity for them is obviated
by a switch to a first-to-file system, where prior inventorship is
irrelevant to patent rights..
Rather than repeal Section 135, House Bill 1908 instead
overhauls it to provide for what it calls "derivation
proceedings."'23 The bill defines them as a "[d]ispute [o]ver [the]
[r]ight to [p]atent" whose purpose is "to determine the right of the
applicant to a patent by . . . finding [whether] another applicant
derived the claimed invention from the applicant requesting the
proceeding and, without authorization, filed an application
claiming such invention."' 24 A derivation can essentially be called
an interference in a first-to-file world - the issue to be decided is
still the rights to a patent, but in a derivation patent rights are
nullified upon showing of a first filer's usurpation of another's
invention, not his subsequent invention.
5. Proposed Repeals within Title 35
A number of the revisions proposed in the Patent Reform Act of
2007 are straightforward repeals of several provisions of the
current Patent Act, mostly because a change to a first-to-file
system would preclude them. Repeals relevant to the priority
system change are scattered throughout the bill: Sections 104, 135,
157, and 291, are the most important.
Section 104 of the current Act forbids establishing prior date of
invention in non-NAFTA and non-WTO countries and allows
inventors in NAFTA and WTO countries the same rights of
priority as domestic inventors.'25 House Bill 1908 would repeal
that section altogether, 26 simply because switching to a first-to-file
system would harmonize American patent law with all other
nations. The 1952 Act's exceptions for priority rules for NAFTA
judicial body within the Patent and Trademark Office that hears both appeals
from patent applicants whose applications have been rejected by the examiner
and interference contests outlined above. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 185 (8th
ed. 2004). Its decisions are directly appealable to the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. Id.
123. H.R. 1908 § 3(i).
124. Id.
125. 35 U.S.C. § 104.
126. H.R. 1908 § 3(d) (emphasis added).
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and WTO nations, therefore, would no longer be necessary.
Section 157 of the current Act provides for a "statutory
invention registration," which is a document consisting of a patent
application's specifications and drawings, registered and
publishable by the patent office, but without the legal force of a
patent. 2 7  Section 157 also provides that if an interference is
declared with respect to a statutory invention registration, it may
not be published unless priority of invention is decided in its
favor.' 2' Though House Bill 1908 groups this repeal under its
first-to-file provisions, the only relation Section 157 has to the
first-to-invent system is the mention of the possibility that
statutory invention registrations will be involved in interference
proceedings. This relationship is tenuous, and the Congressional
Record is unclear why the proposed repeal was considered a first-
to-file provision.' 29  Perhaps Congress viewed Section 157 as
superfluous, since establishing a record of prior invention would
be unnecessary under a first-to-file system.
The Patent Reform Act of 2007 further proposes a complete
repeal of Section 291 of the current Patent Act. 30 Section 291 sets
forth remedies in interference proceedings. '' The proposed
amendments to Section 135 eliminating interferences altogether
renders moot the issue of remedies, making repeal the obvious
solution. Additionally, the proposed changes also eliminate every
reference to the term "interference" from Title 35 for
consistency. 132
6. Further Proposed Changes to Title 35
Most of the remaining changes proposed to the current Patent
Act derived from the proposed switch to a first-to-file system are
merely semantic in nature, ridding the statutory language of any
127. 35 U.S.C. § 157(a).
128. Id.
129. See 153 CONG. REC. S4686 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 2007) (statement of Sen.
Hatch).
130. H.R. 1908 § 3(h).
131. See 35 U.S.C. § 291.
132. H.R. 1908 § 3(j).
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references to'33 or exceptions created by'34 the first-to-file rule.
B. The Congressional Debates
Introducing the bill to the House, Congressman Howard Berman
of California outlined the scope of and reasons for the revisions to
the patent system outlined in the bill.'35 Berman's statement
outlined three main purposes for the proposed revisions: (1)
harmonizing U.S. patent law with the patent laws of other
countries, (2) improving patent quality, and (3) limiting litigation
abuses.' 36 Another argument presented in the bill's favor was that
legislative action precludes the necessity of a separate set of
judicial constructions of an old statute, resulting in patent law less
dependant on an unelected judiciary. 137
Regarding the proposed change to the first-to-file system,
Berman cited the following reasons:
Section 3 converts the U.S. patent system from a
first-to-invent system to a first-inventor-to-file
system. The U.S. is alone in granting priority to the
first inventor as opposed to the first inventor to file
a patent. There is consensus from many global
companies and academics that the switch in priority
mechanisms provide [sic] the U.S. with greater
international consistency, and eliminate the costly
and complex interference proceedings that are
currently necessary to establish the right to obtain a
patent. '38
133. See id. § 3(g)(4)-(5) (striking references to 35 U.S.C. § 102(d)-(e) of the
current Patent Act in other provisions retained after the proposed changes would
take effect).
134. See id. § 3(g)(6) (striking language from 35 U.S.C. § 119 preventing
foreign inventors from using the first-to-invent rule to obtain patents in the
United States).
135. 153 CONG. REC. E773-75 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 2007) (statement of Rep.
Berman).
136. Id. at E774.
137. Id. at H 10254 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2007) (statement of Rep. Issa).
138. Id. at E774 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 2007) (statement of Rep. Berman).
[Vol. XVIII:79
28
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 4
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss1/4
STORMING THE LAST BASTION
In his introduction of the Senate version of the act, Senator Orrin
Hatch of Utah also emphasized harmonization as the goal of the
proposed revisions:
[The bill] is designed to harmonize U.S. law with
the law of other countries by instituting a first-to-
file system. The United States is the only significant
country following the first-to-invent system, in
which the right of the patent lies with the first
inventor, rather than the first inventor to file for a
patent. '
Hatch further stated that the bill "provides greater certainty
because the filing date of an application can very rarely be
challenged."' 4 °
In the debate on the House floor, arguments in favor of the bill's
proposed change to first-to-file largely echoed these desires for
international harmonization.' 4' Harmonization itself was
advocated as facilitating American inventors' ability to secure
patent rights in foreign countries "as international patent protection
becomes increasingly important to their ability ... to compete on a
level playing field."'42 Also, the change to first-to-file was
favorably described as "important to ensuring that those who
infringe on patents continue to have to meet a reasonable threshold
if they assert a 'prior use' defense."4 3
Opponents of the bill on the House floor called it the "Steal
American Technologies Act, the Sequel," comparing its
comprehensive reform with the massively unpopular attempt at
comprehensive immigration reform of the summer of 2006.'" In
his summation of errors he perceived in the bill, Congressman
Dana Rohrabacher of California stated the following:
139. Id. at S4691 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., 153 CONG. REc. H10249 (daily ed. Sep. 7, 2007) (statement of
Rep. Welch).
142. Id.
143. Id. at E1932 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2007) (statement of Rep. Capuano).
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The most fundamental of all, of course, we change
the legal basis of our system from first-to-invent,
which has been, historically, for 200 years, the basis
of the patent system, and now we are changing it to
first-to-file, the way they do in Europe and in Japan.
Do we really want to have a country like Japan?
Look at their creative history. They rely on all of
our ideas to perfect. 145
The first-to-file requirement was, Rohrabacher argued, part of
the bill's more general shortcoming of encouraging scavengers,
both foreign and domestic, to steal innovative ideas from
America's most creative minds.'46 Another argument presented
against the change to first-to-file was that harmonization would
actually favor foreign inventors over domestic ones.147
Even the bill's sponsors acknowledged some difficulties in
switching to a first-to-file system. In his introduction of the bill,
Congressman Berman stated the following:
While cognizant of the enormity of the change that
a 'first inventor to file' system may have on many
small inventors and universities, we have
maintained a grace period to substantially reduce
the negative impact to these inventors. However,
we need to maintain an open dialogue to ensure that
the patent system will continue to foster innovation
from individual inventors. 148
C. Current Status
Despite the opposition, the Patent Reform Act passed the House
with a narrow 220-175 vote, mostly along party lines (only 60
145. Id. at H10253 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2007) (statement of Rep. Rohrabacher).
146. Id.
147. 153 CONG. REc. H10253 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2007) (statement of Rep.
Manzullo).
148. Id. at E774 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 2007) (statement of Rep. Berman).
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Republicans voted for the bill and only 58 Democrats against).'49
In the Senate, the bill left the judiciary committee and was placed
on the legislative calendar on January 24, 2008.5° In a Statement
of Administration Policy dated September 6, 2007, President
George W. Bush expressed broad support for passage of House
Bill 1908, including its provisions switching the United States to a
first-to-file nation.' More recently, however, the Department of
Commerce articulated several points of opposition by the
Administration to Patent Reform Act in its current form. 15 2
Though the Administration continues to support the first-to-file
provisions, it opposes the bill in its entirety unless the proposed
changes to an inventor's right to obtain damages are revised
significantly.'53 Thus, if passed in its current form before January
2009, the bill would most likely not be signed into law. It appears
unlikely, though, that the bill will be resolved before the
November 2008 election, based on the length of time it took to
reach the Senate calendar since its introduction into the Senate in
April 2007.' Also, since the House vote fell so sharply among
party lines, it is unlikely that the bill will make it through the
evenly divided Senate (with two independents), where at least
sixty votes are needed for cloture,'55 without much of a fight. If
149. Office of the Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives, Final Vote
Results for Role Call 893, http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2007/roll863.xml (last
visited Feb. 25, 2008).
150. The Library of Congress, Thomas, http://www.thomas.gov (search the
110th Congress for Bill Number "S. 1145"; follow "Major Congressional
Actions" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 25, 2008).
151. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R. 1908 - PATENT
REFORM ACT OF 2007 (Sept. 6, 2007),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/1 10-1/hrl908sap-r.pdf.
152. See Letter from Nathaniel F. Wienecke, Assistant Secretary for
Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, United States Department of
Commerce, to Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, United
States Senate (Feb. 4, 2008), available at
http://www.ogc.doc.gov/ogc/legreg/letters/ 110/SI 145020408.pdf.
153. Id.
154. Peter Benesh, Attorney: High Court Finds Rules Patently Offensive,
INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Jan. 28, 2008, 2008 WLNR 1501794.
155. See Standing Rules of the Senate, Rule XXII,
http://rules.senate.gov/senaterules/rule22.php (last visited Feb. 25, 2008).
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the bill passes at all, it will likely be after a long and vigorous
debate. Furthermore, in the present uncertain political climate, any
changes in the party holding either the presidency or
Congressional majorities could easily spell death for the proposed
patent reforms.
IV. ANALYSIS
Every time patent reform legislation is introduced that proposes
a switch to the first-to-file system, many arguments fly back and
forth as to why the switch should or should not be effected. In
general, arguments in favor of the switch are grounded on
harmonization of United States laws with international laws and
efficiency. Arguments favoring the status quo, by contrast, tend to
be rooted in Constitutional law and moral rights. Both sides cite
practical considerations as favoring their own positions. These
practical aspects will be dealt with as secondary considerations as
the theory is examined, for they tend to support the theoretical
positions, rather than stand as arguments on their own.
A. Arguments in Favor of the First-to-File Rule
In keeping with established trial structure, the arguments of the
party asserting a claim are presented first. Since proponents of the
first-to-file system are the ones advocating for a sweeping
departure from the American patent system's current
circumstances, the burden falls on them. Their arguments
concentrate around two theses: (1) harmonization with
international law is a desirable end in itself and (2) the first-to-file
system is more efficient.
1. The Harmonization Argument
Harmonization of the United States' patent law with that of the
majority of other nations has been called, "the decisive factor in
adopting the first-to-file system over the American Rule." '156 It
therefore seems appropriate to analyze that argument first.
156. Dickey, supra note 57, at 305.
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In the Congressional debates, the bill's proponents spoke of
switching to first-to-file as giving United States patent law "greater
international consistency"'57 and "harmoniz[ing] U.S. law with the
law of other countries,""' thus treating harmonization in and of
itself as a desirable end result. Switching to a first-to-file system is
seen by its proponents as the next logical step in the evolving
process of the United States' increasing harmonization of its laws
with "international norms," beginning with signing onto the Paris
Convention in 1887, and continuing through the adjustments to
American patent law made in the wake of signing NAFTA in 1993
and GATT in 1994.'59
The main argument presented by proponents of harmonization is
that there is "inherent value in conforming U.S. laws to
international standards."' 6 °  Refraining from signing onto
international harmonization treaties, they argue, builds
international hostility and impedes international relationships.' 6'
"Harmonization" sounds like a desirable end - who, after all,
wants discord? - but the argument that harmonization itself
justifies a massive shift in American patent law is unpersuasive
because it strives more towards good foreign policy than good
property law. A complete revamping of one of American patent
law's fundamental principals ought to rest on firmer ground than
mere goodwill toward other nations. Such a spectacular change
ought rather to be justified by practical considerations.
Practical considerations, however, do play a part in another
harmonization argument offered in favor of switching to a first-to-
file system. That argument states that the United States' first-to-
invent system bars many foreign applicants from entering the U.S.
market, in large part because of the enormous cost of interference
proceedings.'62 Additionally, foreign inventors largely distrust the
United States courts as a vehicle to resolve priority disputes
157. 153 CONG. REC. H10254 or E774 (Apr. 18, 2007) (statement of Rep.
Berman).
158. Id. at S4691 (Apr. 18, 2007) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
159. Dickey, supra note 57, at 306-07.
160. Id. at309.
161. Id. at 310-12.
162. Id. at 307-08.
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because they believe the court system favors domestic litigants.163
Proponents of switching to a first-to-file system argue that the
switch would eliminate any bias toward foreign inventors,
resulting in significant economic benefit because foreign inventors
receive a significant percentage of United States patents.'64
As it turns out, however, the policy argument is chimerical,
since harm to foreign inventors is simply not substantiated by
statistical evidence. A statistical examination 65 of interference
proceedings designed to test common conceptions about both the
first-to-invent and first-to-file systems'66 revealed that of the
interference proceedings between a foreign and a domestic
inventor, the foreign party prevailed fifty-eight percent of the
time. ' 67 Based on these litigation statistics alone, it appears that
the fears of foreign inventors concerning the United States'
priority system are unfounded. It can hardly constitute bias against
foreign inventors when most of their United States patents
withstand priority disputes with domestic inventors. Rather, the
statistics merely suggest that foreign inventors with United States
patents have their inventions' priority judged according to
established practices of American patent law, just as American
inventors filing for foreign patents must expect to abide by foreign
rules.
Some also see the United States' stubborn adherence to the first-
to-invent rule as one last impediment on the road to an
international, or "borderless," patent system, where a uniform,
worldwide system would only require one application to file for
international patent protection.' 68 In such a system, proponents of
163. Id. at 308.
164. Id. ("Japanese firms and individuals alone file for and receive nearly
twenty percent of patents granted [in the United States].").
165. Mark A. Lemley & Colleen V. Chien, Are the U.S. Patent Priority
Rules Really Necessary?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1299, 1328 (2003).
166. Two data sets were selected for this study: (1) the 76 cases on
LexisNexis or Westlaw between 1990 and 2001 decided on the merits of a
priority resolution; and (2) a random sampling of 190 decisions of the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences selected from the 7000 decisions published on
its web page since 1997. Id. at 1305-06.
167. Id. at 1328.
168. See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Patent Harmonization through the United
Nations: International Progress or Deadlock, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
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this argument assert, the redundancy of multiple filings (and their
incident costs) in various nations would be eliminated, drastically
reducing the costs of international patent protection.'69 This is
perhaps the strongest harmonization argument because it uses the
practical goal of efficiency to justify harmonization.
Proponents of the theorized international system favor its
realization through the World Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO"),"° an organ of the United Nations ("UN") established in
1967 with the purpose of "developing international intellectual
property laws and standards" and similar ends.'17  Supporters of
the international system have called WIPO an "unqualified
success,"' 7 ' but its actual track record reveals quite the opposite. A
good illustration of this point is WIPO's "deep harmonization"
plan, which foundered in 1996, was resurrected in 2000, and
stalled again in 2003 because some member nations attempted to
use harmonization to weaken international patent protection by
failing to adhere to some provisions of TRIPS."' WIPO's failed
attempts illustrates the unfeasibility of the ability of an
organization composed of states with weak patent protection - or
no patent protection - to form a coherent, effective system to
secure and enforce the protection of intellectual property to the
degree currently achieved by individual nations. The old adage
that "a chain is only as strong as its weakest link" applies here, for
when intellectual property rights become borderless, enforcement
of those rights is only as strong as it is in the country with the
weakest enforcement. Also, the necessary compromise involved
in forging an international system results in mediocre protection,
since nations with both high and low standards of intellectual
property protection must agree to its terms. The beauty of national
sovereignty, on the other hand, is that each nation can enact and
enforce laws protecting intellectual property to the degree it deems
Soc'Y 5, 10-11 (2004).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 12.
171. World Intellectual Property Organization, What is WIPO?,
http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/what-iswipo.html (last visited Feb. 25,
2008).
172. Mossinghoff, supra note 168, at 12.
173. Id. at 11.
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necessary without having to compromise its standards.
An international system may grant a patentee uniform
protection, but can it grant effective protection? Judging by the
records of both the UN and WIPO, it appears the answer to that
question is no. Domestic inventors appear to have more to lose
than to gain from an international system.
2. The Efficiency Argument
Though the arguments for harmonization are based on efficiency
with respect to future development of international patent law, the
"efficiency argument" as termed in this Article only relates to
efficient operation of the patent system within the United States.
The essence of this argument is that the first-to-file system is more
efficient because prior invention is easier to establish through
filing than invention.'74 It would, its proponents argue, eliminate
costly and time-consuming interference proceedings, sparing
inventors from expensive litigation and the court system from
docket overloads. 1
75
Proponents of switching to a first-to-file system, however,
weaken this argument with another one they offer in their favor:
first inventors are rarely second-to-file, and the first-to-invent rule
is therefore unnecessary.1 76 If this argument is true, then the first-
to-invent rule would not impose a heavy risk on the patentee that
his patent could be rendered invalid, since the laws of probability,
as asserted under this argument, would dictate otherwise. Yet
statistics do not support the assertion that first inventors are rarely
second filers. In the above-cited study of patent cases resolved on
priority grounds, the junior party won only forty-three percent of
the time, meaning that first inventors are more often than not the
second filers. 7 7  A patentee challenged in an interference
proceeding, therefore, has a fifty-seven percent chance of having
his patent invalidated, meaning that patentees face a significant
risk of having a prior inventor's claim invalidate their patents, and
174. See, e.g., 153 CONG. REC. E773 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 2007) (statement of
Rep. Berman).
175. See Dickey, supra note 57, at 303-04.
176. Lemley & Chien, supra note 165, at 1307.
177. Id. at 1309.
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thus less certainty in their patents' validity when obtained. This
uncertainty, though, has little to do with efficiency. The high
invalidation rate reveals that the issue that the interference
procedure seeks to resolve is significant and that arguments in
favor of its retention are legitimate. To argue that the first-to-
invent system is inefficient because it addresses an insignificant
number of priority disputes is, then, simply not borne out by the
facts.
Also, court overload would not be too severe under such
circumstances, since Rule 11171 is in place to weed out frivolous
claims. The United States' notice pleading system sets a very low
requirement to effectively plead a case,'79 so even frivolous claims
initiate the litigation process and its concomitant expenses.
Litigation statistics of interferences reveal, however, that both
first-to-file (seventy-four percent) and second-to-file (eighty-two
percent) parties prevail on the basis of their own assertions, rather
than the opposing party's lapse. 8' These numbers show that
actual cases of frivolous suits are not common, for a party bringing
a frivolous suit would have no valid assertions to bring, much less
use to prevail. The higher percentage of second filers prevailing
based on their own efforts indicates that they are less likely to
initiate frivolous and ineffective claims merely to harass a first
filer than not, for their claims are meritorious enough to assert
priority. Thus, the first-to-invent rule does not burden courts with
an excess of frivolous suits. Whether or not the courts' docket
178. Rule 11 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other
paper-whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later
advocating it-an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying
that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and
belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances . . . the claims, defenses, and other legal
contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (b).
179. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (requiring a pleading to contain inter alia
merely "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief").
180. Lemley & Chien, supra note 165, at 1321.
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load should be encumbered with interference cases is less an
efficiency concern than one of principle, to be dealt with in a
subsequent section.
On an even more basic level, the event that determines
ownership under filing-based priority is dependent on the
complexities and difficulties of communication with the
government. In invention-based priority, ownership determination
is independent of these factors."8 ' To enjoy right of priority to an
invention when invention determines priority, no patent
application need be filed, no patent attorneys retained and paid,
and no knowledge of or familiarity with the patent system
presumed.'82  Thus, obtaining rights to an invention simply
requires the act of invention itself in a first-to-invent system.
Filing, by contrast, requires navigation of the byzantine filing rules
of the PTO, not to mention ample money on hand for fees.'83 In a
first-to-file system, priority depends on this highly bureaucratized
process. A system for claiming priority relying upon filing cannot
be more efficient than filing itself, since it is the act that defines
priority. Complications that may arise during the filing process
would become the same complications appearing in priority
disputes.
Another major objection to the first-to-file system is that
individual and small inventors suffer under this rule because large-
scale inventors are more likely to possess the sophistication and
resources required to file.8 4 A large and well-funded entity is
much better-equipped to meet the government's filing demands -
it can afford filing fees for several simultaneous applications, as
well as patent attorneys experienced in the PTO's workings, and
often has much greater experience with the process of filing an
application than individual inventors. Making priority dependent
on filing encourages inventors to place as much effort and focus on
the process of filing a patent application as on the research,
181. R. CARL MOY, 2 MOY'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 8:36 (2007).
182. Id.
183. In 2005, the average cost of filing a patent application was $11,218.
Christopher A. Cotropia, Nonobviousness and the Federal Circuit: an Empirical
Analysis of Recent Case Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 911, 940 n. 121 (2007).
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development, and invention process itself, encumbering them with
additional efforts and concerns. Thus, while judicial
determinations of priority based on filing date may be more
efficient from the government's perspective, it would encumber
the private sector with additional, government-created concerns to
address, making it less efficient. Large entities can easily afford
the added costs, but for individual and small inventors, these added
concerns can make the process of securing a patent too costly and
time-consuming.
At first blush, it may be easier to establish who first filed an
application than who first invented its claimed invention, but that
is irrelevant. The Intellectual Property Clause ("IP Clause") of the
Constitution states that the goal of the patent system is "[t]o
Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."185 The goal is
not to be as light a burden on the court system as possible or to
determine inventorship with as little inconvenience as possible. In
order to ascertain whether a first-to-file system fulfills the patent
system's constitutional goal, it is necessary first to analyze the
constitutionality of the system - an analysis favored by proponents
of the first-to-invent rule.
B. Arguments in Favor of the First-to-Invent Rule
Those who argue in favor of the current system base their
reasons on more abstract principles than their opponents. The
first-to-invent camp puts forward two important arguments: (1) the
first to file system is unconstitutional and (2) the first inventor has
moral rights that supersede any first filer.
1. The Constitutional Argument
Potentially one of the most damaging arguments against the
pending patent reform bill is that the first-to-file system is
unconstitutional. If the proposed legislation were signed into law
and a challenge subsequently brought against it in a United States
federal court on constitutional grounds, its position would be very
vulnerable. If its first-to-file provisions were found to violate the
185. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
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Constitution, the United States would by default be a first-to-
invent nation. The only way around that conclusion would be the
extraordinarily difficult process of amending the Constitution or
waiting decades for further judicial determinations to allow for
other ways for a first-to-file system to be constitutionally
permissible.
The Constitution, still the supreme law of the United States,
grants the Federal Congress the power "[t]o Promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."' 86  For purposes of this Article, the
operative word in this clause is "Inventors" and the main issue is
how to define it. Opponents of the first-to-file system argue that a
plain reading of the IP Clause requires that only an original
inventor, not the first to win the race to file, can be a patentee.'87
They argue that more than two hundred years of jurisprudence
interpreting the IP Clause have firmly established the meaning of
"Inventor" along the lines of the first-to-invent rule as it is
presently interpreted. 88
Based on historical understanding, outlined in Section II above,
those who view the first-to-file system as unconstitutional appear
to have the better argument. The Constitution was drafted by
former British subjects, and their legal grounding in the area of
patents was the English Statute of Monopolies, from which the
first-to-invent rule developed. The courts' early construction of
"Inventor" as the first to invent, rather than file, from the earliest
cases 89 onward further suggests that the first-to-invent rule was
the commonly understood meaning at the time of the
Constitution's drafting, since they do not treat this interpretation as
any major break with accepted jurisprudence. Indeed, in light of
the history of English and American patent law, the decisions
leading up to the modem codification of the first-to-invent rule
were a natural, uninterrupted development of the same underlying
186. Id.
187. Karen E. Simon, The Patent Reform Act's First-to-File Standard:
Needed Reform or Constitutional Blunder?, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP.
L. 129, 139-41 (2006).
188. Id. at 143-44.
189. E.g., Woodcock v. Parker, 30 F. Cas. 491 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813).
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first-to-invent principle. The meaning of "Inventor" as within this
continuous interpretation is consistent with originalist, strict
constructionist, and textualist views of the Constitution, since it
takes into account tradition, historical circumstances and
established definitions.
Constitutional justifications of the first-to-file rule arise, rather,
from a teleological system of interpretation. The arguments
themselves readily support this assertion, for they rely on the
explicitly stated end of the IP Clause - "[t]o Promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts" - as its operative words.'90 Proponents
of this argument assert that this clearly-stated goal is better served
by a first-to-file system because such a system is more efficient.'9 '
Furthermore, they argue, the IP Clause notwithstanding, patent
legislation can fall under Congress's Commerce Clause powers
and its power to ratify treaties. '92
The argument that a first-to-file system better achieves the stated
goals of the IP Clause is intriguing due to its creativity, and
deserves some analysis. Elaborating on the basic constitutional
declaration of the IP Clause's ends, the Supreme Court outlined
more specific goals of the United States' patent system: fostering
and rewarding invention, promoting disclosure of inventions, and
stimulating further innovation."' It is difficult to see how a first-
to-file system better promotes these ends, particularly with respect
to the first goal. In fact, a first-to-file system often does not
reward the true inventor, but rather punishes him with deprivation
of rights to his invention for not beating a subsequent inventor in
the race to file. Granting a patent to the first inventor to file does
indeed encourage more rapid disclosure - all possible inventors
race to the patent office to be first - but this policy encourages
sloppy disclosures. Care is often sacrificed for punctuality.
Inventors in too much of a rush either file slapdash applications
later rejected and published, or receive a patent with claims
insufficient due to constrained research. Patents with insufficient
claims render improvements discoverable through more thorough
research, and hence includable in the patent, obvious and
190. Simon, supra note 187, at 141-42.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 142.
193. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979).
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unprofitable. Under a first-to-invent system, by contrast, there is
less incentive to rush to file, and thus less likelihood of the winner
of the race failing to meet USPTO disclosure requirements.'94 A
further side effect of the race to file would be a winner-take-all
mentality that could cause potential patentees to view the
possibility of winning the race to be too low, reducing the
motivation to invent.'95 Thus, a first-to-file system would actually
impede, rather than foster, invention. Finally, as stated above, it is
often argued that the first-to-file system harms individual and
small-scale inventors because they could not afford the cost of
continuously filing applications in order to be first to file.'96 Even
the current bill's sponsors have acknowledged that the switch will
pose problems for small inventors.'97 Since many patents are
issued to small-scale and individual inventors, overall innovation
would actually be impeded as they simply choose not to invent in
the face of losing the profits that result from patenting.'98
Accordingly, it appears that practical application of the first-to-file
system does more to frustrate the patent system's constitutional
purposes, rather than foster them.
The Commerce Clause and treaty ratification provisions of the
Constitution have been identified as possible avenues to
effectively work around the IP Clause. The Commerce Clause
avenue relies on the principle that Congress's lack of authority to
legislate under one of its enumerated powers does not preclude its
deriving that authority from another such provision."'
Specifically, they cite use of the Commerce Clause to justify the
constitutionality of the Lanham Act when previous trademark
legislation was struck down by the Supreme Court as outside the
194. F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and
Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REv. 55, 96 (2003).
195. Id. at 97.
196. Simon, supra note 187, at 146.
197. 153 CONG. REC. at E773 (Apr. 18, 2007) (statement of Rep. Berman).
198. Doug Harvey, Reinventing the U.S. Patent System: A Discussion of
Patent Reform through an Analysis of the Proposed Patent Reform Act of 2005,
38 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 1133, 1142 (2006).
199. Timothy R. Holbrook, The Treaty Power and the Patent Clause: Are
There Limits on the United States'Ability to Harmonize?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 1, 22 (2004) (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241, 250 (1964)).
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scope of the IP Clause. 20 The problem with using the Commerce
Clause, however, is that it would create a "horizontal conflict," in
which it is unclear where Congress's IP power ends and its
commerce power begins due to a dearth of jurisprudence on this
issue. On the other avenue, proponents of placing patent reform
under Congress's treaty power argue that in a completely
harmonized global patent system, a patent becomes a
supranational, not a national, right. As a result, the IP Clause
cannot apply, making the treaty power Congress's only available
tool.20 2 This, however, largely depends on viewpoint - the source
of the patent right shifts within the Constitution depending on
whether one views it from a national or supranational perspective.
Such dependence on subjectivity makes use of the treaty power
tenuous at best. Furthermore, as both domestic and international
law stand now, a patent is clearly a national right, so use of the
treaty power to justify the switch to a first-to-file system is based
on a speculative future perspective, not current reality.
Use of both provisions to affect patent jurisprudence is also
controversial because constitutional jurisprudence has allotted
Congress extremely broad commerce and treaty powers, giving
rise to arguments that such broadness impinges upon federalism
inherent in the Constitution.0 3 There is also another, more basic,
constitutional argument against their use. The IP Clause is, to
quote Justice Blackmun, "only one part of an entire Constitution,.
. . [e]ach provision of the Constitution is important, and I cannot
subscribe to a doctrine of unlimited absolutism for [one provision]
at the cost of downgrading other provisions. ' 204 Use of other
constitutional provisions to effectively redefine established IP
Clause jurisprudence seems to smack of the "emanations and
penumbras '' 25 whose use has caused so much controversy in the
political arena. Controversy cannot be afforded in the area of
patents, where tangible economic benefits for millions are at stake.
200. Id. (citing The Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879)).
201. Id. at 22-26.
202. Id. at 39.
203. Id. at 32.
204. N.Y. Times, Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 761 (1971) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
205. Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
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Real economic loss could occur if the courts stray from the IP
Clause and seek justification for the first-to-file system in other
constitutional provisions, sweeping away clarity and certainty in
the process.
This Article makes no attempt to judge which system of
constitutional interpretation is best in general. As far as judging
the system best aligned with the goals of the IP Clause, however,
the analysis clearly favors the more traditionalist interpretations of
"Inventor" as interpreted according to the current first-to-invent
rule. That interpretation has the force of history and established
jurisprudence behind it, and spawns less jurisprudential
uncertainty and controversy than its teleological alternative, which
fails to fulfill the purposes of the IP Clause.
2. The Morality Argument
Another prominent argument that proponents of the current first-
to-invent system utilize is based on abstract principles of justice:
that there can only be one true inventor of any patentable subject
matter, and it is inherently right that only that person may have
rights to it. This argument is not to be conflated with the natural
law theory of invention, an idea expressly refuted by Thomas
Jefferson, the drafter of the 1793 Patent Act:
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible
than all others of exclusive property, it is the action
of the thinking power called an idea, which an
individual may exclusively possess as long as he
keeps it to himself, but the moment it is divulged, it
forces itself into the possession of every one, and
the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it. Its
peculiar character, too, is that no one possesses the
less, because every other possesses the whole of it.
... Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject
of property. Society may give an exclusive right to
the profits arising from them, as an encouragement
to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility,
but this may or may not be done, according to the
will and convenience of the society, without claim
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or complaint from anybody.206
Following Jefferson's logic, then, patent protection is not a
natural right. What the proponents of this argument assert is
something analogous to what Chief Justice Marshall called
"principles of abstract justice. 2 °7  One way to judge how each
system measures up according to this standard is to conduct a
utilitarian "lesser of two evils" test and analyze the harm done
under each. Under a first-to-invent system, a subsequent inventor
may have his patent invalidated if it can be proven that another
invented the same subject of the patent before he did. Under a
first-to-file system, a first inventor can be denied patent rights on
his invention if another files a patent application for the same
subject matter before he does. Thus, the first-to-invent system can
invalidate a patent, while a first-to-file system can render a first
invention meaningless. Put another way, a first-to-file system can
deny an inventor his very right to use invention, rather than merely
his right to monopolize it. Loss of the right to use the invention is
tantamount to the loss of the invention itself, whereas loss of a
right to monopolize does not carry away with it any other rights -
to use or possess, for example. It therefore follows that first-to-file
systems have the potential to cause greater harm to inventors by
essentially depriving them of their inventions.2 8 Thus, the harms
resulting from implementing the first-to-file system weigh heavier
in the classical abstraction of the scales of justice, tipping them in
favor of the first-to-invent system.
Another analysis under the "moral rights" approach is to look at
206. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 9 n.2 (1966)
(quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 1813), in VI
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, at 180-81 (Washington, ed.)).
207. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 572 (1823). In M'Intosh, the United
States government granted land to the defendant, who was then sued by the
plaintiffs, who were granted the same piece of land by the Piankeshaw Indians
years earlier. See id. at 571-72. In holding that the Indians, under the common
law of property, had no valid title by which to grant the land, Chief Justice
Marshall wrote the following: "[I]t will be necessary, in pursuing this inquiry, to
examine, not singly those principles of abstract justice .... but those principles
also which our own government has adopted .. " Id. at 572.
208. See F. Andrew Ubel, Who's on First? - The Trade Secret Prior User or
a Subsequent Patentee, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 401, 417 (1994).
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the grounding of a patentee's rights. A right of prior use (that is,
the right of a first inventor to use his invention) can be viewed as
conceptually independent from a right to a patent - the former
vests naturally upon creation and use of the invention, while the
latter is a fiction created by statute.2"9 In a first-to-invent system,
the two rights are inseparable, the right to patent being defined by
the right of prior use and thus protecting it.2"' Under the first-to-
file system, however, the statutory fiction is the only basis for the
right to a patent, since filing date has no concrete definition
outside of what the statute sets forth. 21 ' Thus, the first-to-invent
system ties the inventor's rights to a concept of moral right arising
out of the fact of his having invented, which is much firmer
philosophical grounding than the first-to-file system's granting of
monopoly rights based on an arbitrarily defined fiction such as
"filing date." Furthermore, the first-to-invent system's
nullification of patents granted to first filers who were second
inventors is logically consistent with that system's coupling of the
prior use and patent rights: if the two rights are inseparable, then
the second inventor cannot retain the patent right when he is not
entitled to the prior use right.
Proponents of the moral basis of the first-to-invent system point
out that most European 212 and industrialized Asian 213 countries, all
of which have adopted first-to-file systems, also create a statutory
right of prior use - that is, first inventors are excepted from the
penalties of infringement on a patent granted to a subsequent
inventor who was first to file.214  They argue that these nations
have adopted the first-to-file system only for its convenience, and
the prior user rights exceptions demonstrate an international
consensus recognizing the superiority of the prior user's right.21 5
209. Id. at 433.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Ireland only
acknowledges prior user rights of the Irish government. Id. at 434.
213. China, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and
Taiwan. India and New Zealand only acknowledge prior user rights of their
respective governments. Id. at 434-35.
214. Ubel, supra note 208, at 434-35.
215. Id. at 433-35.
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That so many first-to-file countries allow for the prior use
exception indicates at least general discomfort with the fairness of
an absolute first-to-file system, and a recognition that certain
equitable concepts require retaining at least some vestige of the
first-to-invent rule.
V. CONCLUSION
The foregoing arguments given to support maintaining the
current first-to-invent system are more persuasive chiefly because
of their reliance on principle. They rely on a textually loyal and
historically sound interpretation of the Constitution, as well as a
simple but powerful conception of justice with respect to first
inventors' rights to their invention. The arguments offered to
bolster the first-to-file system make facially compelling appeals to
efficiency, but closer examination of these claims reveal them to
be unsupported by statistical studies of interference cases. When
these appeals to efficiency falter, all the first-to-file proponents are
left with is the bandwagon argument that conforming to
international norms will increase international cooperation. True
or not, this is a policy argument, not a legal one, and the legal
arguments against the first-to-file system are too numerous and
weighty to be trumped by policy.
The uniquely American first-to-invent system should not be
thrust aside for any perceived benefits of its alternative. The
security of a centuries-old tradition of well-settled first-to-invent
jurisprudence adds an element of certitude and stability to that
approach. As attractive as harmonization may appear to some,
adopting a first-to-file system would only serve to abandon the
constitutional goals of the patent system, cede away sovereignty
on how to direct our own domestic patent system, harm individual
and small-scale inventors, and rob first inventors in most instances
of what ought rightfully to be theirs. Any perceived benefits of the
new legislation's proposed switch to a first-to-file system are not
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